Afterword by Mukherjee, S. N.
12 
Mterword 
S. N. Mukherjee 
The central theme in this book is well stated in the paper by Lola Sharon 
Davidson: 
... a disaster may start as a natural event, but in becoming a disaster it becomes a 
social experience, that is an experience defined and interpreted according to social 
beliefs. Not even natural disasters can remain purely 'natural'. At first glance some 
events appear unequivocally disastrous. Earthquakes and plagues seem to afflict 
indiscriminately everyone who has the misfortune to be in thetr vicinity. Yet some 
people are more vulnerable to their assaults than others - the poor more than the 
rich, or urban dwellers more than those who live in the country. And while few 
people would dispute that such events are disastrous, people nevertheless differ on 
what such disasters may mean. 
In 1974 on one December day, Darwin was struck by Cyclone Tracey. 
What followed confirms Davidson's points about disasters. The nation was 
shaken by the pitiful pictures of a city destroyed, thousands made homeless 
and many dead. This happened during the Christmas celebrations. Suddenly 
there was a strong feeling right across the nation; it was as if everyone in 
Australia was involved with the disaster. The television recorded moving 
scenes at Sydney Airport; people rushed to help the evacuees from Darwin 
with blankets, food parcels and offers of shelters. Then relief funds and 
relief work were organised to help the victims and to rebuild the city. 
Heroes were born. There was a social and economic analysis of the disaster 
and the victims. And then politics raised its ugly head, acrimony followed, 
heroes became villains. Cyclone Tracey could no longer be considered a 
pure 'natural' disaster. It was a social and political experience. It occurred to 
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me that the Darwin disaster could be considered as Australian History in 
miniature, for it reflected all areas of Australian life, society, culture, 
economics and politics. I thought that a study of this and other disasters 
could make us understand societies and culture better, not only with how 
these societies and cultures react to emergencies, but crises like natural 
disasters often bring to the surface some deep rooted problems and cultural 
preoccupations which otherwise remain unnoticed. 
My original idea of organizing an inter-disciplinary and inter-regional 
conference on disasters did not materialize until 1990. In 1988 I heard Peter 
Hinton give a paper entitled Fears of a Nuclear End: Deterrent or Latterday 
Eschatology? (see Hinton 1989) at one of the Sydney Association for Studies 
in Society and Culture's (SASSC) regular seminars. I was impressed by what 
Peter Hinton had to say and we discussed the possibility of holding a 
conference on disasters. Accordingly, in 1990, we organized a one-day 
workshop in Sydney. This workshop was jointly sponsored by SASSC and the 
Centre for Disaster Studies, Cumberland College of Health Sciences. This 
was a successful day. There were papers on Japan, Indonesia, medieval 
Europe, modern Australia, on disasters and gender, on disaster 
management, etc, followed by a good debate. We then decided to hold an 
international conference on the subject. This was eventually organised in 
conjunction with the Institution of Engineers as described by Peter Hinton 
in his Introduction. 
The articles published in this volume are a selection of papers which were 
presented at this seminar. They are organized geographically and 
chronologically. We start with Australia, move on to Japan and then to 
medieval and modern Europe. Peter Hinton introduces these nine papers in 
his Introduction. I shall only highlight the points relevant for this note. 
We start with Stuart Piggin's paper. In it Piggin makes a case for 'history 
as the discipline of context'. The 'context' here is related to the Mt Kembla 
mining disaster. The paper evaluates the memory of the disaster in 'the light 
of the phase in which it was produced' in the altruistic emergency and 
recovery phases, the bitter investigation phase, the mellow club phase, the 
urgent survivor remnant celebrity phase, or the reflective post-survivors' 
phase'. 
Susan Baggett examines the metaphors of unity and division in fire and 
flood ('Bushfires bring people together; floods divide them'). She argues 
that the metaphors applied to fire and flood 'have more to do with the 
identification of these as quintessentially Australian rather than prompted 
from some kind of essence of the phenomena themselves'. Baggett agrees 
that class divisions remain 'one of the primary factors of disunity in 
Australia', but she argues that class is not the motivator of dispute in flood 
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crises, rather it is the lack of a notion of cooperation on a broad scale 'other 
than that contained within mateship' that is the cause of disunity. 
Anderson and Cotton are concerned with the psychological impact of the 
Newcastle earthquake during the first twelve months after its occurrence. 
Their paper is about the victims from the point of the social welfare workers 
and counsellors. 
Robert Ariss examines the AIDS epidemic as a disaster. He approaches 
allopathic medicine or bio-medicine as a hegemonic 'technology of the body' 
in the Foucauldian sense. The victims of the disease themselves 'continue to 
hold a faith in science far beyond what many of its own practitioners 
support'. Ariss warns us against such faith and the superiority of science; this 
'can only lead ultimately to impoverishment of both our ability to pursue the 
good life, and experience dignity at death'. 
Matthew Allen's paper is about Japan. In it, Allen shows how a study of 
the Yamano coal mine disaster of 1965 brought to the surface the underlying 
tensions in the Japanese industrial relations system. The union system in 
Japan, known as enterprise unionism, is considered as ideal system for 
reducing the number of days lost to industrial disputes, for improving 
business efficiency and for enhancing overall economic performance. But a 
study of the Yamano coal mine disaster shows that the economic 
performance was achieved at a great human cost. The enterprise union 
system is an acceptable structure when things are running smoothly, when 
the interests of workers and management are aligned, but when events, like 
the coal mine disaster, move beyond the control of the company and the 
union, the feelings of the victims and their families emerge in a cathartic 
display of animosity directed at both the company and the union. 'Rather 
than being perceived as a representative body for the workers, the union 
came to be seen as "the dogs of the company"'. 
With John 0. Ward's most erudite paper we move into the world of 
Europe in the Middle Ages, with Crusades and popular millenarian 
movements. Ward shows the connections between the two and how the 
Crusades were as big a disaster to medieval Europe as the Black Death is 
known to be. 
Sharon Davidson examines the medieval responses to disasters, 'at least at 
the textual level accessible to us'. It seems to the people of the Middle Ages 
that 'any disaster, as indeed any event, no matter how great or how small, 
had a moral significance and a place in the divine plan. 
James Hatty focuses his attention on Florence during the Plague. Hatty is 
less interested in the demographic, economic and political effects of the 
epidemic than in the reaction of individuals and groups to the Plague. The 
community fought the disease on the basis of their own understanding of the 
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situation. For instance, the Florentines asked for God's forgiveness and 
turned away from sinful living. Some took flight at any opportunity. Finally 
they sought to lay blame for the infection on minority groups which were 
outside the main structure of society - Jews, Muslims, lepers, prostitutes, 
homosexuals, etc. 
David Brook's paper takes us to London in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. He uses Daniel Defoe's A Journal of the Plague Year 
published in 1722, but purported to be written by a bourgeois merchant who 
stayed in London during the Great Plague of 1664. The Journal highlights 
the responses 'to the Plague itself which involve science, practical policy, 
religion, and also responses of human beings to each other under the stress 
of living through the Plague'. Brooks concludes that the Journal is, at times, 
undoubtedly impressive as the record of a human response to suffering and 
the need for mutuality. But, he feels that the document betrays the class 
attitudes and the 'inevitable concomitants of evasiveness and bad faith'. 
It seems to me that our conference in March 1991, on Contextualizing 
Disasters was not so much about the historical, social and political 
backgrounds (as the word context would imply) as it was about cultural 
responses to disasters - in medieval Europe, fourteenth century Florence, 
seventeenth century England, twentieth century Australia, and so on. It is a 
legitimate subject with both theoretical and practical implications. Here I 
give a case study of such responses. My area is Bihar in India and the year is 
1934. 
The Indian Annual Register (JAR) of 1934 recorded what might be 
considered the semi-official and formal version of 'The Disaster' in 1934, 
p.18. 
15 January - A disastrous earthquake occurred in North India to-day and the 
shock was felt in the whole area from Assam to Cawnpore. Bihar was the province 
most affected. The earthquake caused wide-spread loss of life and damage to 
buildings, the full extent of which could not be ascertained owing to interruption of 
telegraphic and railway communication. In Patna division, a government 
communique said, over 500 lives were lost and several hundreds of persons injured 
and over 4,000 houses in the town were either damaged or destroyed. In Bhagalpur 
division, there was not much loss of life estimated at several thousands occurred in 
the hazar which was a heap of ruins. At Jamalpur great damage was done, while 
about 20 died. Tirhut division suffered most, With railways and roads unpassable. 
Many lives were lost in Muzaffarpur Town and buildings damaged. Darbhanga was 
equallv affected. Roth palaces of the Maharaja of Oarhhanga were dam~ged. In 
Muzaffarpur and Darbhanga almost every European factory was damaged. 
By 28 January it was estimated that in Monghyer and Muzaffarpur alone, 
'deaths of human beings would exceed twelve thousand' houses and markets 
destroyed, over 100,000 cattle destroyed, and 'towns were stinking on 
account of the dead bodies under the debris which were not extricated' (JAR 
Vol.1:19). In fact we now know that in Bihar alone over twenty thousand 
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people died, many more injured, properties reduced to rubble, 
neighbourhoods disappeared. 
The news of the earthquake, or at least the scale of it, was not known to 
the wider public outside the disaster area for some time. On 15 January 
Nehru felt the tremor in Allahabad while standing on the veranda of the 
family home addressing a group of peasants. He did not know then, nor 
could he guess, 'what those two or three minutes had meant to millions in 
Behar [Bihar] and elsewhere' (Nehru 1988:481). That night he travelled with 
his wife to Calcutta. During the night the train took them through the 
earthquake area, totally unaware of the calamity. It was not until 18 January 
that Nehru knew about the Bihar disaster. For some time parts of Bihar 
were completely cut off from the rest of India; roads, railways and telegraph 
lines were out of action; 'over approximately nine hundred miles there was 
hardly a mile of track of the Bengal and The North Western Railway which 
was not seriously affected' (JAR 1934:218). 
The governments in Patna (capital of Bihar) and New Delhi were slow to 
react to the disaster. As the news of the earthquake reached Patna on the 
morning of 16 January, the government despatched a team of eleven doctors 
and medical students to Monghyer and the next day another such team to 
Muzaffarpur and Tirhut. The Bihar government acquired two aeroplanes 
from Calcutta for gathering news and making reconnaissances in the 
affected area. 
The Viceroy of India set up a fund for earthquake relief and he himself 
donated Rs5,000 towards it. The King-Emperor and the Queen donated 
£150 (Rs1,900). By the end of February the government had collected about 
Rs500,000. The Bihar government had also started another relief fund. They 
could not, however, raise quite as much money. The Viceroy in New Delhi 
and the Governor in Patna were more interested in sending medical aid, 
with doctors, medical students, nurses, medicines and blankets, than clearing 
debris and saving lives. The armed forces were deployed to help to clear 
debris and provide tents and blankets for displaced persons. But they came 
rather late to be useful to save life. It would seem that the government policy 
was more concerned with protecting and restoring properties and factories 
than providing relief for the victims. Moreover, as India was governed under 
the 1919 Act which upheld a federal system, the central government was 
unwilling to intervene which they considered a question 'primarily' for the 
local government (JAR 1934, p.89). 
It was proposed that a fund to the tune of three crores (30 million) to be 
raised so that it could be given out as interest-free loans or at low interst 
rates to individuals and groups to recontstruct Bihar. The government of 
India was willing to give one crore to the Bihar government, half of it as a 
192 Disasters: Images and Contexts 
loan and half as a gift. Accordingly, Sir Alan Parsons, Financial Secretary to 
the government of India, visited Patna to discuss the financial problems of 
the disaster (IAR 1934, p.89). 
It was, however, estimated that 50 crores (500 million) was needed for the 
reconstruction of Bihar. The government made no provision to raise such 
large funds. The government plans did not include emergency measures for 
relief, nor the restoration of municipal services. No government dignatory 
visited the devastated area. 
The nationalists were quick to react and criticize the government. On 12 
February Nehru issued a statement to the press: 'No-one blames the 
government for the earthquake. But if the government fails to act at the 
right moment, it is inefficient, and if this failure results in serious loss to the 
community, it must be held responsible for this loss' (Nehru 1974:197). 
Nehru blamed the government for not acting swiftly, and not trying to save 
life and lessen human suffering. He thought that a state of emergency should 
have been declared and the Army and the Railway workers should have 
been employed to clear the debris, immediately after the news of the 
calamity had reached Patna: 'A fact, which has a terrible significance, is the 
recovery of living persons from under the debris, day after day, right up to 
the thirteenth day after the earthquake many bodies were also recovered 
which doctors testified to having died a day or two earlier. How many died 
during that fateful period when they might have been rescued alive if real 
efforts in that direction had been made?' (Nehru 1974:198). 
The British officials, however, were preoccupied with something which 
they considered far more serious and disastrous than the Bihar earthquake. 
This was the rising tide of 'terrorism' in Bengal. If records were to be 
believed then the government spent more time and energy in suppressing 
'terrorism' than in any other public affairs. 
On 8 January 1934 at the Calcutta European Association Annual Dinner, 
the Viceroy referred to the Bengal 'terrorists' as 'the greatest enemies of 
their own country' and he promised his audience that the full resources and 
power of the government would continue to be employed against 'terrorism' 
(IAR 1934:17). Accordingly, the government took draconian measures to 
combat extremism; they forced an amendment of the Bengal Criminal Act 
through the Legislative Council placing some extraordinary powers in the 
hands of the district magistrates and the police to harass terrorist suspects. 
A reign of terror ensued in Bengal, more particularly in Chitagong and in 
Midnapore. 
In Chitagong all suspected youths were rounded up and all young men 
were forced to stay at home for a week. In Midnapore villagers were 
harassed for not saluting the Union Jack; men were flogged in public and 
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their properties destroyed. Many books and magazines were proscribed and 
many 'suspected terrorists' were detained without trial throughout Bengal. 
The 'Terrorism' continued unabated, bombs were thrown at European 
cricket matches, and in May 1934 there was an attempt to assassinate the 
Governor of Bengal and thousands joined the Terrorist cause. The 
government, however, continued with its ruthless policy of suppression. 
Nehru called this a 'political earthquake', when a government loses all self 
control, 'has no clear purpose in view except that of destruction and the 
desire to revenge itself on its adversaries' (Nehru 1974:152). 
It seems that the official response to the Bihar disaster was cautious and 
constrained by financial necessity and constitutional law. The government 
showed more interest in giving medical aid and loans to rebuild houses and 
properties than saving lives and providing immediate relief. Moreover, the 
British were preoccupied elsewhere in Bengal, fighting 'Terrorism'; to them 
this was a greater disaster than the Bihar earthquake. 
Nehru and the nationalists reacted swiftly, as soon as the news reached 
them. Sir Prafalla Chandra Ray, the well known scientist and philanthropist, 
appealed for help: 
North Bihar is literally a whole mess of ruin. Lakhs (hundreds of thousands) have 
lost their dwelling houses and are now exposed to weather and wind. Wells have 
either gone dry or have been choked with sand thrown up from fissures made in the 
surface of the earth. Thousands of acres of what were most fertile land before the 
quake are sandy deserts today ... 
Remember we are on our trial shall, we shall have to live on one meal and part w1th 
the other for their sake I rressinglv urge mv hrothers and sisters to realise this and 
contribute to the best of their capacity (JAR 1934:21 ). 
While most Indians did not give up their meals to save them for their 
'brothers and sisters' in Bihar, thousands, however, helped with money, 
blankets, food, shelter and voluntary labour. Dr Rajendra Prasad, the future 
first president of the independent Republic of India, started a Central Relief 
Fund as soon as he got out of prison (Gandhi 1974:44). The Congress used 
its national and international networks to raise funds, recruit volunteers and 
publicize the plight of the victims and their relief works. Most leaders were 
in and out of prison, but they still managed to obtain more volunteers than 
they could handle (Nehru 1974:191) and received well deserved publicity. 
Nehru visited North Bihar twice and helped to raise funds in Allahabad 
before he went back to prison in February. He left some moving 
photographs and a vivid description of Muzaffarpur and the victims there: 
Muzaffarpur was in ruins. Thousands of houses had collapsed and many that 
remaineo standing were cracked and dangerous to approach. 
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The streets were full of bricks and debris. Many of the smaller lanes were wholly 
blocked by the fallen material and one had to mount up ten feet or more to cross 1t 
.... The debris still covered corpses. I saw corpses bemg carried away for disposal. 
I saw also a corpse emerge as the debris was being removed to clear a lane. It was 
that of a young man. His arm was up, apparently to protect himself from a falling 
wall . . . There was no escape for those who lived in the crowded quarters of the 
city, with its narrow lanes, no escape especially for the women folk (Nehru 
1974:186-187). 
No doubt the nationalists, more particularly the Congress Party, was 
moved by the plight of the victims in Bihar and willing and able to help. But 
as we have already noticed, Nehru and his friends were quick to use the 
disaster ami the government relief efforts as a weapon to criticise the official 
policy. Moreover, the Congress was eager to show that they could provide an 
efficient and humane alternative to the British rule in India and hence used 
the disaster (Nehru 1988:484-489). 
In 1934, Gandhi was busy fighting untouchability. Earlier that year he was 
in South India collecting funds, opening schools for Harijans (untouchables), 
lecturing to thousands of men and women about the evils of untouchability 
and discussing with community leaders about the possibilities of abolishing 
untouchability. He came to know about the Bihar disaster sometime on 23 
January 1934. On 24 January, Gandhi mentioned the Bihar disaster at a 
public meeting in Tinnevelly: 
You may call me superstitious if you like, but a man like me cannot but believe that 
this earthquake is d1vine chastisement sent by God for our sins .... For me there is 
a vital connection between the Bihar calamity and the untouchability campaign. The 
Bihar calamity is a sudden and accidental reminder of what we are and what God is: 
but untouchability is a calamity handed down to us from century to century. It is a 
curse brought upon ourselves by our own neglect of a portion of Hindu humanity. 
Whilst this disaster in Bihar damages the body, the calamity brought about by 
untouchability corrodes the very sour (Gandhi 1974:44-46 ). 
Later that day he urged his audience in Tuticorin 'to be "superstitious" 
enough with me to believe that the earthquake is a divine chastisement for 
the great sin we have committed and are still committing against those 
whom we describe as untouchable, Panchamas, and whom I describe as 
Harijans' (Gandhi 1974:46-47). 
Gandhi was criticized by some members of the public for not rushing off 
to Bihar: 'must Mahatma fiddle while Bihar is burning?' But Gandhi firmly 
believed that Ciod had chosen him for the Harijan cause, which was a far 
greater calamity than the earthquake in Bihar. He did not rush to Bihar, he 
refused to divert his Harijan funds to the victims in Bihar, and he took every 
opportunity to tell his audience that the Bihar earthquake was God's 
punishment for the sin of untouchability. Yet he urged his people to help the 
victims in Bihar, collected donations for the central Relief Funds, volunteers 
from his Ashrams went to help in the devastated area, and he urged the 
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government and the Congress workers to co-operate to help Bihar, 'the 
birthplace of Sita'. Gandhi repeated his arguments in almost all his 
correspondence during the first half of the year. He urged everyone to help 
Bihar and fight untouchability: 'Let anti-untouchability reformers regard the 
earthquake as a nemesis for the sin of untouchability. They cannot go wrong, 
if they have the faith that I have. They will help Bihar more and not less for 
that faith. And they will try to create an atmosphere against reproduction of 
untouchability in any scheme of reconstruction' (Gandhi 1974:87). 
Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941), the poet from Bengal, was shocked by 
Gandhi's speeches on the Bihar earthquake. As a child of the Bengal 
Renaissance Tagore was unable to accept Gandhi's unscientific views on 
God and social evil: 
It has caused me painful surprise to find Mahatma Gandhi accusing those who 
blindly follow their own social custom of untouchability of having brought down 
God's vengeance upon certain parts of Bihar, evidently selected for his desolating 
displeasure. It is al the more unfortunate because this kind of unscientific view of 
things is too readily accepted by a large section of our countrymen (Gandhi 
1974:503-506. 
He warned Gandhi that this kind of argument, using a natural calamity as 
an example of god's work against some social evil could easily be used 
against the Mahatma. His opponents could argue that it was Gandhi and his 
followers who were responsible for the visitation of 'Divine anger'. As a true 
son of Bengal Enlightenment he appealed to Gandhi: We who are 
immensely grateful to Mahatmaji for inducing, by his wonder-working 
inspiration, freedom from fear and feebleness in the minds of his 
countrymen, feel profoundly hurt when any words from his mouth 
emphasize the elements of unreason in those very minds - unreason which 
is a fundamental source of all the blind powers that drive us against freedom 
and self-respect' (Gandhi 1974:503-506) 
Nehru joined the debate supporting Tagore against the Mahatma: 'To 
suggest that a human custom or failing had its reactions on the movements 
of the earth's crust is an astounding thing. The idea of sin and divine wrath 
and man's relative importance in the affairs of the universe, - they take us 
back a few hundred years, when [the] Inquisition flourished in Europe and 
burned Giordano Bruno for his scientific heresy and sent many a witch to 
the stake' (Nehru 1974:490). 
Gandhi was unrepentant; he was no modern rational intellectual; he was a 
faithful servant of God: 'With me the connection between cosmic 
phenomena and human behaviour is a living faith that draws me nearer to 
my God, humbles me and makes me readier for facing Him. Such a belief 
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would be a degrading superstition if out of the depth of my ignorance I used 
it for castigating my opponents' (Nehru 1974:164-166). 
In a way Gandhi was right; his irrational faith in God touched the hearts 
and souls of ordinary Indians, and he could do more to help the victims in 
Bihar and the untouchables. And the Mahatma raised more funds and more 
volunteers than his rationalist intellectual friends could do. 
It seems that my case study illustrates the points raised by Sharon 
Davidson, that disasters are not just natural events, but social experiences, 
and people differ about the relief works and dispute the meaning of such 
events. In Bihar the British Government was cautious, and being 
preoccupied with a 'political disaster' in Bengal, they did not respond to the 
earthquake with the urgency that was needed to help the victims. the 
nationalists rallied to help, but partly because they wanted to prove the 
efficiencv of their organization and to criticize the government. Gandhi 
thought that God had shown him a way to connect the Bihar calamity with 
untouchability. The relief workers on the ground, who came from various 
groups, probably helped the victims more than the government or the 
nationalist leaders. 
The Finance Member of the Bihar government said that 'the disaster has 
drawn us together. our minds have been touched to first issues. Let us see to 
it that in the new Bihar that will rise out of its ruin this happy union will 
continue' (JAR 1934:53). This wa~ a pious hope. No sooner the debate about 
the Bihar Relief work was over, tht: fight between the imperial power and 
the nationalists started again and t ht: 'new' Bihar is yet to materialize. 
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